====== Performance Fee ======
Performance Fee (also known as an '[[Incentive Fee]]') is a payment made to an investment manager for generating positive returns. Think of it as a bonus for a job well done. Unlike a standard [[Management Fee]], which is typically a fixed percentage of the total assets being managed, a performance fee is conditional. It's only paid out if the fund's value increases. This structure is very common in the world of [[Hedge Fund]]s and is sometimes used by specialized [[Mutual Fund]]s. The stated goal is to align the manager's interests with the investors'—the idea being that the manager only makes significant money when you, the investor, make money. However, as with many things in finance, the devil is in the details. A poorly structured performance fee can create perverse incentives, so it's a critical component for any investor to understand before handing over their capital.
===== How It Works =====
Performance fees aren't just a simple "you win, I get a cut" arrangement. They usually come with a few important rules of the road to ensure fairness. The most common structure is a combination of a management fee and a performance fee.
==== The "2 and 20" Model ====
You'll often hear about the classic "2 and 20" fee structure, which was the long-standing gold standard for hedge funds. It’s a simple but potent recipe:
  * **The "2":** This is a 2% annual management fee charged on the total [[Assets Under Management]] (AUM), regardless of the fund's performance. It covers the fund's operational costs like salaries, rent, and research.
  * **The "20":** This is the 20% performance fee. The manager takes 20% of the fund's profits for the year.
So, if a $100 million fund grows to $110 million, the manager would earn a $2 million management fee (2% of $100M) plus a $2 million performance fee (20% of the $10M profit). While this model is famous, intense competition has forced many funds to offer more investor-friendly terms.
==== The High-Water Mark ====
This is one of the most important investor protections you can find. A [[High-Water Mark]] is the highest peak in value that an investment fund has ever reached. A performance fee can only be charged on profits that push the fund’s value //above// its previous high-water mark.
Let's say you invest $100, and it grows to $120. The manager takes a performance fee on that $20 profit. The new high-water mark is now $120. The next year, the market tanks, and your investment drops to $90. The year after, it recovers back to $120. The manager gets **no performance fee** for that recovery from $90 to $120, because they haven't generated any profit for you above the previous peak. They only start earning a performance fee again on gains above $120. Without a high-water mark, a manager could lose your money and then charge you a fee just for earning it back—a definite no-go.
==== The Hurdle Rate ====
A [[Hurdle Rate]] is a minimum rate of return that a fund must achieve before any performance fee is calculated. It's like a jump bar in an athletic competition; the manager has to clear it before they can claim a prize. This ensures the manager is rewarded only for performance that is truly exceptional, not just for returns you could have gotten elsewhere with less risk.
The hurdle can be a fixed percentage (e.g., 5% per year) or, more commonly, it's tied to a market index or [[Benchmark]], like the [[S&P 500]]. If the hurdle rate is the S&P 500's return, and the index returns 8% in a year, the fund manager would only earn a performance fee on profits //above// that 8% return. This prevents you from paying a hefty fee for returns that simply tracked the market.
===== The Value Investor's Perspective =====
From a [[Value Investing]] standpoint, performance fees are a double-edged sword. [[Warren Buffett]] has often criticized fee structures that reward managers handsomely without them having any "skin in the game."
==== A Tale of Two Incentives ====
On one hand, the logic is appealing: pay for performance. On the other hand, it can create a dangerous "heads I win, tails you lose" dynamic.
  * **The Good:** In a perfect world, a performance fee aligns interests. The manager is highly motivated to generate strong returns because their compensation depends on it.
  * **The Bad:** It can encourage reckless behavior. If a fund is performing poorly, a manager might be tempted to take huge, speculative risks to try and get "back in the money" and earn that fee. The manager gets all the upside from a winning bet, while the investor bears 100% of the loss from a failed one. This is the opposite of the prudent, risk-averse mindset central to value investing.
==== What to Look For ====
If you're considering an investment with a performance fee, do your homework and look for a structure that truly protects your interests.
  * **A high-water mark is non-negotiable.** Never invest in a fund that doesn't have one.
  * **Look for a reasonable hurdle rate.** Is the manager being paid to beat a risk-free rate like a [[Treasury Bill]] or a broad market index? The hurdle should be meaningful.
  * **Check the management fee.** A high management fee (e.g., 2%) on top of a performance fee means the manager gets paid well even if they perform poorly. Lower is better.
  * **Does the manager eat their own cooking?** The best alignment of all is when the manager has a significant portion of their own personal wealth invested in the fund alongside you. This is a far more powerful incentive for prudence and performance than any fee structure.